

## Corrections and improvements to

Hans Peters: *Game Theory – A Multi-Leveled Approach*, Springer, 2015, ISBN 978-3-662-46949-1

- Page 8: In Fig. 1.1 a  $B$  is missing.
- Pages 21, 69, 489: The correct reference to Selten's 1965 paper is  
Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit, Teil I: Bestimmung des dynamischen Preisgleichgewichts. *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 121, 301–324.
- Page 77, lines 3 and 5: Replace  $y_1$  by  $y_2$ .
- Page 85, Problem 5.5: Replace “profit” by “revenue”.
- Page 107, Fig. 6.6, bottomline:  $\delta^{T-3}$ .
- Page 129, first line: Replace  $L$  by  $R$ .
- Page 136, Problem 7.4 (a) and (b): Include mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
- Page 146, line –4:  $1 > y > \frac{1}{2}$ .
- Page 190, Problem 10.11: Note that  $v_1(N)$  and  $v_2(N)$  are the total (monopoly) profits.
- Page 271, line 7: Replace “for” by “form”.
- Page 312: In the definition of SMON insert “and for all  $i \in N$ ”.
- Page 366, Fig. 20.1: There should be an arrow in the most right edge.
- Page 406: Insert a blank line after “value of  $a$ .” in RP7.
- Page 411, Problem RP16: Replace “action” by “strategy”.
- Page 411, Problem RP17: Note that this problem is about a simultaneous (one-shot) game.
- Page 452, 14.5: There are three types of equilibria, where the plural (types) refers to the fact that the beliefs are not always unique.
- Page 434, 6.11(e): The equilibria are the elements of the set  $\{(b_1, b_2) \mid b_2 \geq v_1, 0 \leq b_1 \leq v_2\} \cup \{(b_1, b_2) \mid 0 \leq b_2 \leq v_1, b_1 \geq v_2, b_2 \leq b_1\}$ .

- Page 469, RP7(a): For  $a < 0$  there are three equilibria:  $(B, L)$ ,  $(T, R)$ , and  $((1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2))$ . For  $a \geq 0$  the answers in the book are correct.
- Page 470, RP11(d): “always  $(D, R)$  has to be played.”
- Page 474, RP18(b,c):  $\beta = 1/4$  instead of  $\beta = 1/2$ .
- Page 478, last line:  $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1$ .