Hidden Symmetries and Focal Points

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October 05, 2008

Abstract:
We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of alternative symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand. The definition of a symmetry structure is given in steps of increasing complexity allowing us to precisely explain differences between existing definitions.

Keywords: symmetry, focal points, frames, Nash equilibria

JEL Classifications: C72, D83